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POWER, KNOWLEDGE, AND RELATIONSHIPS 
WITHIN THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: A FOUCAULDIAN CRITIQUE 
 
TIMOTHY NOONAN 
 
 
“Perhaps the most fundamental flaw in the 
Sentencing Guidelines is that they are based on the assumption 
that you can, in the name of reducing disparities, isolate from 
the complexity that every sentence presents a few arbitrary 
factors to which you then assign equally arbitrary weights--
and somehow call the result ‘rational.’”1 
- Hon.  Jed S. Rakoff 
INTRODUCTION 
Since their inception, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been 
subject to criticism. Various commentators, both inside and outside of the 
judicial system, have raised issues ranging from the significant curtailment 
of judicial discretion to the failure to address the disparities that were the 
part of the impetus for their creation.2 Over the years, some of these 
criticisms have been addressed, either through the actions of the 
Commission or through the judiciary,3 while others, like sentencing 
disparities along racial lines, remain stubbornly persistent.4 The Guidelines, 
contrary to their original intent,5 formalize and codify these disparities. Just 
 
 
  J.D. Class of 2017, Washington University School of Law. 
1 Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be Scrapped, 26 FED. 
SENT. R. 6 (Oct. 2013) 
2 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 281-84 (1993); Albert W. Alschuler, 
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN.  L. REV. 85 (2005); 
Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173 (2010). 
3 See e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (finding a Sixth 
Amendment violation where the judge increased the sentence beyond the Guideline maximum based on 
judicial, not jury, fact-finding), United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (rendering 
the Guidelines effectively advisory finding 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) unconstitutional 
under the Sixth Amendment). 
4 See William Rhodes et al., Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005-2012, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5432 
5 Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent Of Uniformity In Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 749, 752 (2006) (“[Showing respect for the dignity of criminal defendants] was a central, but now 
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as the prison system encourages and refines criminal activity by physically 
putting people in the same box,6 the Guidelines serve as the conceptual 
equivalent, confining the analysis of the person to a series of boxes. The 
creation of centralized bureaucracy for the collection and dissemination of 
information not only analogizes itself to the Foucouldian Panopticon,7 but 
it also furthers the removal of the unique aspects of the individual from the 
core dialogue surrounding criminal punishment8 and  establishes its own 
incentive for self-perpetuation.9 This exercise of power through abrogation 
and objectification exacerbates the isolation of the individual from society, 
increasing the potential for recidivism and removing incentives for 
successful reintegration into society.10 
The Guidelines, as proposed and as realized, fail to address the basic 
issue they were intended to solve, disparities in sentencing outcomes 
between similarly situated defendants. Ultimately, judges, and the judicial 
system as a whole, were unequipped to administer a rehabilitative 
 
 
frequently overlooked, concern of Frankel's. [...] Uniformity, however, was originally supposed to be 
both rationalizing and humanizing.”). 
6 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 266 (Alan Sheridan 
trans., Vintage Books 2d. ed., 1977) (“The prison cannot fail to produce delinquents.  It does so by the 
very type of existence that it imposes on its inmates: whether they are isolated in cells or whether they 
are given useless work, […], it is, in any case, not ‘to think of man in society; it is to create an unnatural, 
useless and dangerous existence’[.]”). 
7 Foucault, supra note 6, at 195-228 (trans. Alan Sheridan 1977). Foucault’s Panopticon was 
adapted from Jeremy Bentham’s concept of a circular prison with the individual cells set in an outer wall 
and open towards a central tower in the middle. The design could enable a single guard to exert power 
over the entire population through the constant specter of surveillance. For Foucault, this structure was 
a physical manifestation of a mechanism of social control, occurring not only in the penal system but 
throughout schools, the military and other social institutions. 
8 Id. at 200 (“He is seen, but does he not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in 
communication.”). 
9 Sharon Dolovich, CONFRONTING THE COSTS OF INCARCERATION: Foreword: Incarceration 
American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 245 (2009) (“The most obvious mechanism for this form 
of [carceral] institutional parthenogenesis is the infliction of significant burdens on the incarcerated, 
both during the prison term and afterwards, which collectively increase the likelihood that they will 
commit new crimes after release.”); Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our 
Devolving Standards of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 68 (1998) (“The dimensions of the 
crime problem are so poorly and unreliably measured that the prison-industrial complex will prosper 
less by solving the problem than by investing substantial resources in creating, maintaining, and 
expanding its own markets.”). 
10 Isolation, both in the physical sense experienced through incarceration and in the social sense 
experienced through so-called collateral consequences, has a demonstrable relationship to recidivism. 
See Cynthia Calkins, et al., Sexual Violence Legislation: A Review of Case Law and Empirical Research, 
20 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 443, 452 (2014) (stating a connection between social isolation and 
increased recidivism among sexual offenders); STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST., 3d ed.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2004) (promoting reduced recidivism through limiting collateral sanctions which further isolate convicts 
upon re-entry), Jim Earhart, Overcoming Isolation: A College Program Challenges Prison Culture 
Through Engagement, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 329 (2014) (discussing an educational program of 
promoting engagement, even when limited, within the prison system as reducing recidivism). 
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sentencing regime.11 Early reformers saw the wild disparities in sentencing 
as arbitrary and capricious.12 Judges could, and did, increase sentences 
based on whims or pique.13 These were the “bad” judges.14 The proposed 
reform, a system of structured, factorized discretion promulgated by a 
central bureaucracy left the flawed judiciary largely untouched. The reform, 
as enacted, largely enabled a harsher and more punitive approach than was 
originally intended.15 The resulting Guidelines have not only failed to 
ameliorate sentencing disparities but have, in many cases, exacerbated 
inequities in sentencing.16 While some of this may be attributable to the 
political landscape in which the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, the 
fundamental flaw lies in applying a mechanistic, systematic approach to a 
uniquely individualized process. 
 This note will examine the sentencing process within the symbolic 
framework established by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison,17 and further refined through his later works, by looking 
at the way the creation of the Sentencing Commission and promulgation of 
the Guidelines rearranges the relationships within the criminal justice 
system.18 The first section will look at the historical context leading to the 
 
 
11O’Hear, supra note 5, at 762 (“Frankel's critique of judicial discretion echoed much of the 
broader critique of the rehabilitative ideal: too much power was being given to officials in the criminal 
justice system who did not really know what they were doing, and who were prone to use their power in 
ways that were arbitrary and cruel.”) 
12 Id. at 760 (“‘There is dignity and security,’ [Frankel] wrote, ‘in the assurance that each of us - 
plain or beautiful, rich or poor, black, white, tall, curly, whatever - is promised treatment as a bland, 
fungible ‘equal’ before the law.’  No such assurance was available, however, in a world of vast, unguided 
judicial discretion at sentencing.”) quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT 
ORDER 11 (1973). 
13 Id. at 761 (recounting a paradigmatic anecdote wherein Frankel spoke disapprovingly a fellow 
judge for increasing a sentence by a year for “speaking disrespectfully.”). 
14 Rodney J. Uphoff, Misjudging: On Misjudging and Its Implications for Criminal Defendants, 
Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 534 (2007) (“[A] significant number 
of criminal defendants are trapped in front of mediocre or "bad" judges whose attitudinal biases color 
their evidentiary rulings, factual determinations, and the sentences they mete out.”) 
15 Marvin Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and 
Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 662 (1993) (“Sentencing commissions and guidelines are, first, to 
cure lawless disparity; then, more long range, to help educate legislators and the public to accept a more 
civilized (generally less harsh) sentencing regime.”). 
16 Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755, 1761 
(1992)  (“Nothwithstanding laudable congressional goals, the guidelines continue to increase the number 
of men and women incarcerated in our federal prisons, resulting in abhorrent social and economic costs.  
The guidelines have generally resulted in longer sentences, prolonging the dehumanization of 
incarceration.”). 
17Foucault, supra note 6. 
18 David Garland, Foucault's Discipline and Punish An Exposition and Critique, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 847, n.2 (1986) (“Foucault is not a structuralist in the sense of one who strictly follows 
the methodological rules of structuralist analysis […]. He is, however, concerned to identify the 
structures that define the shape and limits of discourses and of institutional practices.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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creation of the Guidelines, particularly focusing on how the exchange of 
information between the defendant and the sentencer has evolved. The 
second section will introduce certain of Foucault’s theories with reference 
to their relevance to the Guidelines. The third section will look critically at 
the effect of the guidelines on the central discourse in sentencing: the 
discourse between the judge and the condemned, the object of judgment. 
 II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN SENTENCING 
The procedural and theoretical aspects of sentencing seen today have 
grown and changed in relation to this base discourse. The modern 
sentencing relationship, and the specific power dynamic between the 
sentenced and sentencer, began developing at the start of the nineteenth 
century, along with the growth of the penitentiary, fully coalescing in the 
rehabilitative model of sentencing in the early twentieth century.19 Early 
American law imported much of the English common law, complete with 
punishments that were largely fixed and largely capital, while, in some 
cases, adding a Puritanical severity.20 While juries didn’t directly decide 
sentences, they were at least generally aware of the punishment.21 
Functionally, this meant that the jury, in deciding guilt, was deciding the 
punishment. Further, colonial and early American juries were empowered 
to make findings on both facts and law.22 The defendant could, and did, 
argue both the facts of the case and the law itself.23 The defendant was still 
free to argue about not just the factual underpinnings of the charge but the 
 
 
19 Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or 
Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 694-95 (2010) 
20 SOL RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION § 16 (2d ed. 1973) (“In respect of felonies, the 
unalterable judgment of life, with attainder and forfeiture implicit, was adopted, and the so-called 
discretion available in the cases of lesser offense portended only a choice between bodily afflictive 
sanction or a fine.”). Rubin also notes the importance of the colonies’ religious beliefs in informing the 
severity of punishments, particularly the proscription, banishment, and execution of Quakers by the 
Puritans of Massachusetts and Virginia. Id. 
21 Gertner, supra note 19 at 692 (“Jurors plainly understood the impact of a guilty verdict on the 
defendant because of the relative simplicity of the criminal law and its penalty structure, and often 
because of the process by which they were selected.”); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 303, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). 
22 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function Of The American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
377 (1999). 
23 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United 
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869-76 (1994). As explained by Alschuler and Deiss, it was the colonial 
jury’s role in resisting English authority, particularly in enforcement of libel laws, that helped inform 
the inclusion of Sixth Amendment. They use, as a practical example the prosecution of John Peter Zenger 
under seditious libel laws. Alexander Hamilton’s defense of Zenger argued, contrary to the law at the 
time, that the truth could be a defense. The jury, against the instructions of the judge, found for Zenger 
under that argument. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/9
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appropriateness of applying the law to those facts. While the existence of 
fixed punishments meant the defendant was not making a quantitative 
argument similar to modern sentencing, there was nonetheless a discourse 
about the fairness of a particular punishment in response to a particular 
action. The jury, in announcing the verdict, decided not only whether a 
crime had been committed, but whether the accused would be allowed to 
live among them.24 
With the advent of the nineteenth century, the states began to dial back 
the use of the death penalty, increase the use of prisons, and allow jury 
discretion in selecting sentences for felonies.25 As the law grew more 
complex, the sentencing decision began to shift to the province of judges.26 
The dichotomy we see today, where juries decide fact and judges decide 
law, coalesced under a rehabilitative theory of punishment. Judges became 
“sentencing experts,” responsible not just for the application of the law but 
an adjudication of the person being sentenced.27 The rehabilitative theory 
sought to correct the problem of crime through sentencing, requiring (or 
allowing) the judge to weigh and assess a panoply of factors about the 
convict and their underlying offense.28 The offender could, through 
corrective treatment, be retrained and reintroduced into society – the 
judge’s job was to determine the appropriate treatment.29 The corporal, 
retributive punishments of the colonial era became theoretical, economic, 
and psychological, acting not on the body but on the mind.30 
Beyond the general theory of rehabilitation, to which judges had 
widely varying degrees of sympathy, there was little guidance or procedural 
protection.31 There was little meaningful appellate review beyond the 
 
 
24 United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]ncarceration was not a 
sentencing option: the colonists accepted the prevailing belief in the basic depravity of humanity, ‘a 
feeling that made any notion of an offender's possible rehabilitation absurd.’”) citing to A. CAMPBELL, 
THE LAW OF SENTENCING § 2, at 9 (1978) (footnote omitted)). 
25 Nancy J. King, Lessons from the Past: The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United 
States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2003). 
26 Gertner, supra note 19 at 694-95. 
27 Id. at 695 (“Crime was a ‘moral disease,’ whose cure was delegated to experts in the criminal 
justice field, one of whom was the judge.”). 
28 Id. See also Douglas A. Berman, Symposium: Sentencing And Punishment: Conceptualizing 
Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 388-90 (2006). 
29 Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2005) (“The rehabilitative ideal often was conceived and discussed in medical terms, 
with offenders described as ‘sick’ and punishments aspiring to ‘cure the patient.’”). 
30 Foucault, supra note 6, at 139 (“What was being formed was a a policy of coercions that act 
upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior.”). 
31Adam Lamparello, Introducing the “Heartland Departure”, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 
644 (Spring 2004) (“Prior to the advent of the Guidelines, sentencing decisions were primarily the 
product of unfettered judicial discretion; no rules, principles, precedent, or purposes guided or controlled 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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permissive proportionality standards of the Eighth Amendment.32 As such, 
judges didn’t write sentencing decisions and no common law surrounding 
sentencing developed.33 Due in part to a narrow doctrinal focus in legal 
education34 and the relatively homogeneous demographic makeup in the 
legal profession as a whole,35 the purported sentencing experts were being 
asked to do a job for which they had little training or experience.36 This 
judicial discretion worked in tandem with the parole system, which had 
wide latitude as to how sentences were ultimately enacted.37 Ultimately, this 
system resulted in widely varying sentencing outcomes and a perception of 
inequality and disingenuousness.38 
This history is illuminating in two ways. The first is that the creation 
of the Guidelines was a reaction to the perceived lawlessness of the prior 
sentencing regime.39 The most prominent reaction was from Judge Marvin 
Frankel of the Southern District of New York, who wrote extensively on 
the lack of guiding law or principles in sentencing. His work would largely 
inspire the eventual creation of the Guidelines, albeit not necessarily in the 
form he had imagined.40 It was not a movement towards a particular goal 
but rather an intentional departure. If the creation of the Guidelines had a 
philosophic goal, that goal was the desire for order. The ultimate reform 
was significantly less concerned with what form that order would take. As 
 
 
district court judges in their determinatio[n] of particular sentences to impose.”); see also Erik Luna, 
Misguided Guidelines A Critique of Federal Sentencing, Policy Analysis No. 458, 3-4 (Cato Institute 
2002) https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/misguided-guidelines-critique-federal-
sentencing (“Under a favorable interpretation, then, federal trial judges were part social worker, part 
soothsayer—gauging the length of sentence based on an unguided evaluation of the necessary conditions 
for rehabilitation and indoctrination of pro-social behavior.”). 
32 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1180, 155 L. Ed. 2D 108 (2003) (“Eighth 
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence [but] forbids only 
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”) citing to Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2D 836 (1991). 
33 Lamparello, supra note 31, at 644-45; see also Gertner, supra note 19, at 696-97. 
34 Gertner, supra note 19, at 696-97 (“Sentencing was not taught in law schools; and to the extent 
there was any debate about deterrence and rehabilitation…it was not reflected in judicial training.”). 
35 AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2016), available 
at:http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-
tables-2016.authcheckdam.pdf. 
36 Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 528 (2007) (“It was as if judges were functioning as diagnosticians without 
authoritative texts, surgeons without Gray's Anatomy.”). 
37 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 226-27. 
38 Id. at 227-28. 
39 Jon O. Newman, Remembering Marvin Frankel: Sentencing Reform But Not These Guidelines, 
14 FED. SENT. R. 319 (2002). 
40 Id. (“Wisely cautioning his readers not to ‘accept delusions of precision,’ [Frankel] pointed out 
‘that numerical statements may serve, for obviously non-quantifiable subjects, as useful implements for 
clarification of thought, comparisons, and criticism.’” MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 113 (1973)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/9
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such, the vestigial aspects of the preceding regimes remained intact. The 
reform simply overlaid a literal grid on top of the extant regime. The other 
important aspect of the history is the presence throughout the history of 
American sentencing of a discourse between sentenced and sentencer. 
While this relationship is relatively obvious in the rehabilitative era, it was 
paradoxically stronger under determinate sentencing than under the 
guidelines. The colonial jury, bound as they were by limited and fixed 
punishments, nonetheless was free to find for a defendant, not because the 
evidence failed to support a guilty verdict, but because the law was simply 
unfair as applied to the defendant or generally.41 The defendant was still 
able to engage in the discourse. The essential relationship, the sentencing 
discourse, was between the defendant and the jury. While sentencing 
discretion later shifted to the judge, the base discourse remained the same.42 
The defendant had a voice with which to assert their humanity, either by 
asserting the unfairness of the punishment or of the law as applied to their 
circumstances.43  
 A. The Creation of Federal Sentencing Commission and the 
Sentencing Guidelines 
The impetus for sentencing reform came to fruition during the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan in the form of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.44 Although the underlying legislation had originally been introduced 
in 1975 by Senator Edward Kennedy, the final bill was signed in 1984 by 
President Reagan, who also signed into law a number of other reformatory 
measures.45 The bill’s journey from conception by the liberal reformer to 
actualization by the “get tough on crime” president saw significant changes 
 
 
41 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 23.   
42 Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Judging Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. 
Rev. 1247, 1252 (1997) (“Those present at a sentencing proceeding in a federal […] witnessed a ritual 
of undeniable moral significance. It was critical that this proceeding took the form of a face-to-face 
encounter between individuals…The meaning of this solemn confrontation was clear: only a person can 
pass moral judgment, and only a person can be morally judged.”) 
43 United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 8, n. 28 (2011) 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-
minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf  (“Pardons, lack of enforcement, the fiction of 
“benefit of clergy,” and jury nullification contributed to the lack of executions in the colonies.” 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 41-43 (1993)). 
44 Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§211-300, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040 (1984) (codified as amended 18 
U.S.C. §§3551-3742 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§991-998 (2012)). 
45 Stith & Koh, supra note 2. 
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in the text and purpose of the law.46 Like much broad and far-reaching 
legislation, the passage of the final bill required much in the way of political 
compromise, with the “law-and-order” generally prevailing.47 The result 
was the creation of a commission, appointed by the president, with a 
mandate to create the labyrinthine structure that governs federal sentencing 
today. The final bill, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, created the 
Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Commission then created the 
Guidelines. Accordingly, the effects of the 1984 bill were to create an 
oversight body and a regulatory structure, each of which has a different 
impact on the sentencing system. To understand the impact on sentencing, 
each structure should be analyzed as a distinct body with a unique effect, 
creating a new bureaucratic discourse. This discourse has its own effect, 
separate and distinct from those of its component bodies. Each of these 
effects reorganizes relationships and redistributes power within the criminal 
justice system. As such, each aspect of the overall scheme is worth looking 
at separately. 
 i. The Sentencing Commission 
The United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body 
within the federal judiciary, “sits at the intersection of all three branches of 
government and synthesizes the interests of the three branches to effectuate 
sound federal sentencing policy.”48 The “core mission” of the Commission 
is to promulgate the sentencing guidelines and related amendments.49 As a 
corollary purpose, the Commission serves as a research and information 
center for sentencing data, statistics, and issues, as well as providing 
training to the federal judiciary on sentencing issues.50 Structurally, the 
Commission consists of seven voting members and one non-voting 
member, appointed by the President to staggered six-year terms,51 and 
contains four advisory committees, representing practitioners, probationary 
officers, victims, and tribal interests.52   
 
 
46 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 284 (“[W]hatever early proponents of guidelines may have 
expected, it is clear that Congress desired a significant degree of rigidity and harshness in the sentencing 
guidelines.”). 
47 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 285 (“[T]o the extent that ideological and political objectives did 
significantly affect outcomes in both Congress and the Sentencing Commission in the 1980's, it is not 
surprising that "law-and-order" concerns dominated.”). 
48 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 A-1 (2015). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). 
52 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 (2016) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION RULES]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/9
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The Commission, in addition to amending and promulgating the 
Guidelines, engages in a quasi-rule-making procedure. Amendments to the 
Guidelines are proposed, considered, and released on a yearly cycle. The 
Amendments are subject to the same notice and comment provisions as the 
rest of federal administrative rulemaking.53 Additionally, the Commission 
publishes, as a part of the amendment process, notice of the priorities the 
Commission will be using in the upcoming cycle.54 The 2016-17 Priorities 
include several continuing studies, including encouraging the use of 
alternatives to incarceration, resolution of circuit conflict, and more specific 
provision, like the applicability of the “safety valve” provision55 in a variety 
of circumstances.56 
The oversight structure of the Sentencing Commission creates 
potential positives as well as significant concerns. While this structure 
provides a hitherto non-existent body specifically tasked with 
understanding federal sentencing norms and patterns, it also creates a new 
bureaucratic structure, removed from the defendants, with significant 
discretion and practical authority but very little in the way of definitive 
guidance.57 Sentencing is a complex enterprise, involving not only the 
factual circumstances of the predicate crime but, potentially, the entirety of 
person’s life.58 Reducing the panoply of potential mitigating and 
aggravating factors present in any human existence to quasi-scientific 
formula with any expectation of fairness is a fraught proposition,59 
particularly when doing so over a federal judiciary that handed down 
73,125 sentences in the 2015 fiscal year.60 The general oversight structure 
provides the framework for a feedback loop under which sentencing can be 
 
 
53 Id. at 6-7; see also 5 USC § 553. 
54 COMMISSION RULES, supra note 52, at 8. 
55 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
56 81 Fed. Reg. 58004-01. 
57 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 281-84; see also Berman, supra note 29, at 12 (“Congress 
provided no express instructions concerning the specific application of sentencing purposes throughout 
the federal guidelines system. In turn, the United States Sentencing Commission, though making an 
initial effort to formulate guidelines premised on one particular theory of punishment, ultimately dodged 
these fundamental issues by relying primarily on the results of past judicial sentencing practices as the 
foundation for the initial federal sentencing guidelines.”). 
58 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1252. 
59 See Luna, supra note 31, at 9 (“Distant government bodies such as Congress and the 
commission lack the capacity to evaluate the facts of a specific crime or the circumstances of a particular 
offender. […] A far off agency can no more judge specific criminals than a blindfolded expert can 
appraise the worth of unseen paintings.”). 
60 U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Method of Disposition—During 
the 12-Month Periods Ending June 30, 1990 and September 30, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011 Through 
2015 http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table5.04.pdf. 
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understood, organized, and guided.61 Such a system could balance the 
inevitable outliers of a decentralized system and correct for the lack of 
expertise of the sentencing experts.62 The Commission as it was enacted, 
and has further demonstrated in practice, exerts much more control over the 
process than a mere support and guidance function.63 Even for the most 
ardent proponents of sentencing reform, the Guidelines went too far in 
restraining judicial discretion.64 Even post-Booker, the Guidelines and, by 
extension, the Commission, exhibit significant control over sentencing. 65 
For all the complaints about limiting judicial discretion, it appears that 
judges are generally unwilling to aggressively exercise the discretion they 
do have.66 As such, the Sentencing Commission plays a dominant, 
centralized role in the broad landscape of sentencing. 
 ii. The Guidelines: Discretion Within Boxes  
The precursor to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Parole 
Guidelines promised "a scientific and objective means of structuring and 
 
 
61 See Eric S. Fish, Criminal Law Sentencing and Interbranch Dialogue, 105 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 549, 556 (2015) (“Even the framework of the federal sentencing system is compatible 
with the logic of dialogue. The federal guidelines are now advisory, the federal Sentencing Commission 
collects exhaustive data about federal judges' sentencing practices, and the Sentencing Reform Act 
instructs the Commission to consult with judges and other actors when updating the guidelines.”). 
62 Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 533, 538 (2016) (“To be 
sure, with the enactment of the Guidelines, there was considerably more judicial training in sentencing 
than there had ever been prior to their enactment, during the era of the ‘old rehabilitation.’ Significantly, 
this was training in the application of the Guidelines' formulas and how to compute the numbers, but 
there was still no training on the purposes of sentencing, alternatives to incarceration, what works to 
prevent recidivism or to effect deterrence.”). 
63 Id. (“The Sentencing Commission would not permit any other agency to provide training on 
sentencing, even though the Federal Judicial Center, whose mission was to train judges, was well 
equipped to do so.”); see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1274 (“[T]he Commission has gone 
out of its way to make it clear that it alone will determine the scope and application of concepts employed 
in the Sentencing Guidelines, regardless of any teachings of the substantive law of crimes or the 
experience of federal and state governments in elaborating the criminal law.”). 
64 Jon O. Newman, Remembering Marvin Frankel: Sentencing Reform But Not These Guidelines, 
14 FED. SENT. R. 319 (“Indeed, [Frankel] recognized, as did many supporters of sentencing reform, that 
the Commission's version of a guidelines system was an excessive displacement of the reasonable 
discretion sentencing judges ought to have, even though it should be subject to some degree of structure. 
Commenting on the guidelines in the fifth year of their operation, he agreed that complaints about their 
‘inflexibility’ had ‘considerable merit.’”). 
65 Courts provided non-governmentally-sponsored Guideline departures in less than a quarter of 
cases. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, COMPARISON OF SENTENCE IMPOSED AND 
POSITION OF SENTENCE RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE BY YEAR, 2015 Sourcebook, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2015/FigureG.pdf. 
66 Gertner, supra note 62, at 540 (“In effect, the Guidelines enabled judges to cede moral decision 
making to another body; their task became the application of an apparently rational formula to the case 
at hand - a purely cognitive process.”). 
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institutionalizing discretion in parole release decision-making."67 Both the 
Parole Guidelines, and the subsequent Sentencing Guidelines, attempt to 
quantify (almost) every aspect of the sentencing decision, applying a 
formulaic approach by assigning value to the myriad factors, combining the 
values, and then plugging the end result into a pre-determined grid. Prior to 
the implementation of the Guidelines, judges were generally only limited 
by the statutorily defined maximums and, less typically, minimums. The 
potential range of the sentence was defined in terms of years. Under the 
Guidelines, where the range is limited,68 the discretion is defined in terms 
of months. While the Guidelines, since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Booker,69 are advisory, only ten percent of 2015 federal 
sentences departed from the Guidelines for non-specified reasons.70 Due in 
part to a degree of jurisprudential confusion, judges are understandably 
reticent to depart from the Guidelines.71 The full Guidelines Manual is over 
600 pages long. By far, the bulk of the Manual is contained within Chapter 
Two which lists the various offenses and assigns a number representing the 
offense’s severity, as well as a variety of offense-specific factors which may 
be added to the base severity.72 Once the offense severity is calculated, the 
offender’s criminal history score is calculated.73 The scores are then 
inputted into a grid, with offense severity on the vertical axis and the 
criminal history score on the horizontal. The grid is comprised of boxes 
which contain sentencing ranges termed in months.74 Within the 
recommended range, the sentencing judge has unlimited discretion. 
 
 
67 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 229 (quoting William J. Genego et al., Project: Parole Release 
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 823 (1975)) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 
(Nov. 19, 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 26,652 (Sept. 24, 1973)). 
68 28 U.S.C.S. § 994 (b)(2) (“If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of 
imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of 
that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the 
range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.”). 
69 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). 
70 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK (2015)  
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2015/FigureG.pdf. 
71 See e.g., Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (finding that an explicit 
abandonment of rehabilitation necessitated invalidated a sentence imposed so that the defendant could 
attend drug treatment); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) (finding evidence 
of an offender’s post-sentencing rehabilitation could be considered when imposing a new sentence after 
a previously vacated sentence). 
72 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A1.1-X7.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
73 Id. §§ 4A1.1-B1.5 (An offender’s criminal history is primarily based on the number of prior 
sentences, violent offenses, and crimes committed while on release.). 
74 Id. ch. 5 pt. A; see infra Appendix. 
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Without, the judge retains some discretion but generally must provide 
specific reasons for departing.75  
The Sentencing Guidelines are structured around three statutorily 
defined goals: (1) to incorporate generally the purposes of sentencing, (2) 
to “provide certainty and fairness”, and (3) to qualifiedly reflect “the 
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process”76 with particular attention paid to “certainty and fairness.”77 
The formulation reflects, by declining to further address or define 
sentencing purposes, a lack of purpose-driven guidance and a focus on 
empirically driven guidance.78 The enacting legislation explicitly declines 
to adopt a particular theory of punishment and, consequently, none has been 
adopted.79 The prevailing political concerns of the time were headed 
towards greater severity.80 The political impetus of sentencing oversight 
was guided, in part, by a shift from the rehabilitative model to an increased 
clamor for deterrence or retribution.81 Further, the subsequent adoption of 
mandatory minimum sentences, career criminal enhancements, and three-
strikes laws demonstrate a political commitment to more severe 
punishments.82 The enacting legislation, though, was the result of a long 
series of compromises.83 While Congress acknowledged the importance of 
purpose in sentencing, the task of defining the overarching philosophy fell 
to the Commission.84 The Commission ultimately ignored the issue and 
 
 
75 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). 
76 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). 
77 28 U.S.C. § 994 (f); The “certainty and fairness” dictate may be the Guidelines’ biggest failure. 
It has been widely argued that the Guidelines have brought neither. Some of this is due to the sheer 
complexity of the Guidelines and the subsequent difficulty in enacting and interpreting them. One can 
make the argument that creating a system that well-educated and experienced practitioners find 
confusing inherently undermines any degree of certainty on the part of general public. See Albert W. 
Alschuler, supra note 2, at 89 (“Adopting the viewpoint of a person of ordinary moral sensibilities rather 
than of the Sentencing Commission leads quickly to the conclusion that the Sentencing Guidelines have 
substituted new disparities for old ones.”). 
78 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 240-41. 
79 Lamparello, supra note 31, at 654. (“[The Guidelines] grid suffers from the same flaws that 
characterized pre-Guidelines sentences -- there exists no explicit purpose or stated principle justifying 
the criminal sanctions that are applicable for each particular offense.”). 
80 See Gertner, supra note 19, at 698 (“The public, and certain members of the academy, gave up 
on rehabilitation as a central purpose of sentencing, instead championing a philosophy known as 
‘limited’ retribution”), Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 150 
(2013) (defining a period from 1984 to 1996 as defined by a “tough on crime” approach to sentencing). 
81 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 240. The authors note that the Sentencing Reform Act’s Senate 
champion, Edward Kennedy, who was clearly a liberal, seemed to support a retributive model. Id. n. 
100.   
82 Tonry, supra note 80, at 150. 
83 Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 230-39 (chronicling the legislative history, debates, and failed 
precursors to the Sentencing Reform Act). 
84 Steve Y. Koh, Reestablishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 
1116-17 (1992). 
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focused on mathematical averages and past practice.85 The one guiding 
principle that survived was the need for order and structure.86 The end result 
of the process was a systematic solution to a very human problem. 
 III. GUIDELINES PANOPTICON: DOCILE BODIES AND POWER-
KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIPS 
Foucault has been referred to as a “theorist of paradox.”87 His 
analytical critiques involved reversing the underlying assumptions and 
premises of the social institutions and developments that he studied. In 
Discipline and Punish, he questioned the orthodoxy of the reformist, 
rehabilitative model of criminal justice, in large part by shifting the focus 
from the macro-level institutions to the “micro-physics” of power.88 While 
aspects of his methodology and analytical scope may be subject to 
criticism,89 the core concepts and the symbolic framework he developed are 
nonetheless useful in examining social structures and their relationship to 
the individual person.90 
 
 
85 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18 (1988) (“It is important to realize that the Commission's 
‘past practice’ compromise does not reflect an effort simply to reconcile two con-flicting philosophical 
positions. It reflects a lack of adequate, detailed deterrence data, and it reflects the irrational results of 
any effort to apply ‘just deserts’ principles to detailed behavior through a group process.”). It has been 
posited that the failure of the Commission to engage adequately with the question of sentencing 
philosophy was due to the inexperience of the original Commissioners. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal 
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers., 101 YALE 
L.J. 1681, 1741-42 (1992) (“In retrospect, the trouble began with the appointment of the Commission's 
initial seven members….None of the members had extensive experience in sentencing offenders in a 
high-volume urban court….No member had significant experience with the process of change, with 
efforts to reform the criminal justice system, or with the obstacles to modifying a multidiscretionary 
decisionmaking process with long traditions and specialized roles.”). 
86 Breyer, supra note 85, at 18 (“The result of this compromise is that the Commission's results 
will reflect irrationality in past practice, but only to a degree. Since the Commission employed typical 
past practices, the Guidelines tend to avoid unjustifiably wide variations in sentencing. This, after all, 
was part of the Commission's basic statutory mission.”); see also Tonry, supra note 80, at 150 (“The 
focus [of sentencing reform] was on the sentencing process and on individual sentences, but not on their 
effects. The underlying values were procedural fairness, proportionality, equal treatment, and 
rationality.”). 
87 Garland, supra note 18, at 848. 
88 Id. at 852; see also Gerald Turkel, Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 170, 170 (1990) (“Foucault conceptualized power as it is exercised, as multiple and decentralized, 
and as productive of social structures and knowledge.”). 
89 Garland, supra note 18, at 849 (Foucault’s focus on the prison as inextricably indicative of the 
wider social structure ends up as “alarmist and implausible.”). 
90 MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
1972-1977, 198 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980)(“Power in the substantive sense, 
'le' pouvoir, doesn't exist. […] In reality power means relations, a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, 
co-ordinated cluster of relations.”) see also Dany Lacombe, Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social 
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Fundamental to a Foucauldian analysis of an institution is the premise 
that power is not a thing that’s possessed and exercised but a force that 
arises from the interaction between people and social structures.91 Power 
arises from and may be exercised within a particular relationship. The 
judge’s power to sentence arises, not from the state as an abstract body, but 
from the relationship between the state and the subject. Laws, such as they 
are, do not create and define power so much as they guide and direct it. 
Broadly speaking, Discipline and Punish traces the history of modern 
punishment from the “spectacle of the scaffold,”92 wherein punishment was 
corporal and public, to the “punishment of the soul,”93 which acted upon 
the mind and sought to correct the aberrant behavior. As such, punishment 
became corrective, subjecting the juridical object to discipline, rather than 
retributive. This shift occurs simultaneously with the development of the 
social sciences, expanding the knowledge of the human person,94 and the 
development of more advanced systems of production, which depend on 
“docile bodies.”95 The prison was therefore a means of social control as 
opposed to the social reaction on which the historical regime was 
predicated.96 The criminal, instead of being visibly severed from society, 
was accepted and internalized.97 
 
 
Control Thesis, 47 BRIT. J. SOC. 332, 334 (1996) (“This conception of power and the subject facilitates 
an understanding of law reform that does not reduce it to a structure that simply reproduces the dominant 
social order. On the contrary, Foucault's concept of power, understood in the context of 
'governmentality', allows us to begin to reconfigure the complex relationship between structure and 
agency.”). 
91 Turkel, supra note 88, at 179 (“[T]he juridical subject emerges from relations of power, from 
technical manipulations and moral discourse focused on the body.”). 
92 Foucault, supra note 6, at 32. 
93 Garland, supra note 18, at 852 (“Foucault uses the notion of ‘the soul’ to refer to what 
psychologists variously term the psyche, the self, subjectivity, consciousness, or the personality. […] 
For Foucault it is the soul that is ‘the seat of the habits’ and so is the target of disciplinary techniques.”). 
94 Id. at 853. 
95 Foucault, supra note 6, at 135-38. 
96 In the beginning of Foucault’s punitive timeline, the criminal was subjected to a range of violent 
and explicit acts, including drawing and quartering, hanging, and other forms of torture, all justified in 
the name of the king. Foucault, supra note 6, at 14. As society developed a greater reliance on individual 
property rights and a more democratic social structure, the criminal justice system moved to a more 
centralized political institution. Id. at 90 (“The right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of 
the sovereign to the defence of society.”). Punishment moved from a direct assault on the body of the 
criminal to an attack on the idea of the crime, both its genesis in the criminal’s head and as a broader 
concept. The criminal became the representation of the crime; in punishing one, the state was attacking 
both. 
97 This process is simultaneously made possible by and the result of a transition towards more 
humane punishment. For torture to exist, there must be some segregation between the offender and the 
rest of the population. Otherwise, it’s an unthinkable exercise of state power. See Peter Halewood,  
Sameness/Difference, International Human Rights Law, and the Political Meaning of Torture, 22 
BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 257, 259 (2012) (“Dehumanization allows states to assert, to themselves and 
others, that they are not "torturing" a body possessing dignity.”). 
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This process was achieved through the growth of “disciplinary 
power,”98 a power based on knowledge.99 This form of punishment “rest[s] 
on a whole technology of representation” which expands the punitive 
scope.100 It is both a punishment and a message.101 Each punishment, 
therefore, informs the next. To be effective, the punishment, its subject, and 
its object must be understood. So, the process of punishment becomes one 
of observation. Offenders, crimes, and behavior are objectified, classified, 
and normalized.102 Psychology, sociology, and criminology all contribute to 
the idea of the offender as a subject, capable of being stripped down to data 
points. Once the subject is reducible, then the data can be compared and 
norms established. Once norms are established, the regime may be 
determined and deviations may be identified and corrected. Through 
correction, the deviation may be labeled and, as such, limited. The corollary 
to this is acceptance of deviance as a part of an overall scheme, which 
Foucault designated as “delinquency.”103 As such, the system becomes 
softer, gentler, and pervasive. Once the system accepts deviance, it 
incorporates that deviance. 
All of this takes place within a system which has both softened and 
expanded the view of crime or, in Foucault’s words, “crimes seemed to lose 
their violence, while punishments, reciprocally, lost some of their intensity 
but at the cost of greater intervention.”104 Justice becomes the protector of 
the law-abiding individual. The state becomes responsible for both the 
criminal and the victim.105 The law becomes more than a definition of the 
outer boundaries of socially acceptable behavior and develops into the 
 
 
98  Lacombe, supra note 90, at 332. 
99 Id. 
100 Foucault, supra note 6, at 104 (“[Finding a suitable punishment] is an art of conflicting 
energies, an art of images linked by association, the forging of stable connections that defy time: it is a 
matter of establishing the representation of pairs of opposing values, of establishing quantitative 
differences between the opposing forces, of setting up a complex of obstacle-signs that may subject the 
movement of the forces to a power relation.”). 
101 Foucault, supra note 6, at 101 (The application of punishment shifts from “the body; with the 
ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brandings in the ritual of the public execution; it is the mind 
or rather a play of representations and signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the 
minds of all.”). 
102 Lacombe, supra note 90, at 332, Garland, supra note 18, at 859. 
103 Foucault explains the inevitable connection between prison and recidivism: by adopting the 
prison as the means of punishment, society accepts a certain amount of delinquency; by neither fully 
severing nor fully integrating the deviants, society accepts their continued existence.  Foucault, supra 
note 6, at 257-92. 
104  Foucault, supra note 6, at 75. 
105 This trend even contributed to the Sentencing Guidelines. Among the initial impulses for 
criminal justice reform was the desire to simplify a sprawling and complex criminal code. Stith & Koh, 
supra note 2, at 232. 
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model for how to behave within society.106 The institution becomes a means 
of enforcing conformity, establishing normative boundaries and assigning 
appropriately weighted punishments to transgression of those boundaries. 
Crime and criminal justice move into the realm of social control and 
economics.107 Institutions become self-sustaining.108 The prison becomes 
an entity in its own right, creating its own incentives.109 The creation of the 
prison apparatus leads, implicitly, to the necessity of crime.110 The 
imperative to “solve the problem of crime” is gone because crime, as 
represented by the criminal, has been quarantined, walled off both 
physically and psychologically. 
Fundamental to the knowledge aspect is Foucault’s concept of 
surveillance.111 For knowledge to be gathered, the subject must be arranged 
such that they can be observed. From this arises the adoption of the 
Panopticon as epitome of his central concept. It is an architectural scheme 
that allows for the few to maximally observe the many without fear of 
exposure themselves.112 While Foucault vastly over-estimated the 
 
 
106 “Every year, additional crimes, increased punishments, and novel applications of the criminal 
justice system enter U.S. jurisprudence […] Any expansion may appear gradual - another crime here 
and an enhanced sentence there - and the latest criminal provision or practice may seem trivial in effect. 
Over time, however, the United States has experienced a dramatic enlargement in governmental 
authority and the breadth of law enforcement prerogatives.” Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 703, 703 (2005). 
107 Foucault, supra, note 6, at 138 (“What was being formed was a policy of coercions that act 
upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was 
entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it.”). 
108 Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
71, 73 (2016) (“Support for the prison industry turns out to be widespread and tenacious, even among 
those who oppose mass incarceration, when it serves their financial or political interests. For example, 
Senator Durbin, a vocal critic of mass incarceration, recently trumpeted his support for the opening of 
Thompson Prison, calling it ‘a significant investment in the economic future of northern Illinois.’”). 
109 The total population of U.S. jails and prisons in 2015 was 2,173,800. OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 (2016).  Supervising this 
population was a total of 427,790 corrections officers and jailers. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, MAY 2015, 33-3012 CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND 
JAILERS (2017). . At a mean annual wage of just over 45,000 dollars, that payroll cost for corrections 
officers, not including any other prison system employees, is over $19 billion per year. Id. Even without 
considering the contractual expenditures for health care, food services, and other support services, this 
amount supports a lot of families and creates a lot of political capital. See Alexander Volokh, 
Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2008) 
(“[S]elf-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is already common in the public sector - chiefly from 
public-sector corrections officers unions.”). 
110 See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
71, 79 (“The prison industry is an archetypal example of an established industry preventing public-
spirited reform because of the incentives of existing stakeholders.”). 
111 Garland, supra note 18, at 859 (“‘The examination’ is, for this system, a central method of 
control, allowing close observation, differentiation, assessment of standards, and the identification of 
failure to conform.”). 
112 Id. at 860 (“It took the form of a circular building, with individual cells around its perimeter 
whose windows and lighting were arranged so as to make their occupants clearly visible to the central 
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importance of this structure to society as a whole, the central metaphor 
remains particularly relevant in the digital age. As advanced means of data 
collection become more insidious and pervasive, symbolic architecture of 
the Panopticon becomes more and more appropriate.113 For present 
purpose, the symbolic structure may be viewed as any centralized accretion 
of knowledge.114 The gathering of information itself becomes a means of 
control wherein the objects of surveillance conform their behaviors in 
response to the possibility of being observed.115 This structure enables 
institutions collect information, analyze, normalize, and then regulate 
accordingly.116 Subjects, which in Foucault’s analysis are prisoners, are 
thereby subject to rigors of discipline designed to retrain their habitual 
functioning, making them fit for release into society.117 This system, 
however, cannot but produce delinquency.118 This may be because it seems 
to confuse the action with the purpose. The process of observing and 
understanding societal norms becomes a purpose in and of itself, 
independent of any greater notion. A prisoner is considered fixed, in this 
system, when they are normalized. But the desirability of normalizing and 
 
 
inspection tower, though it remained opaque to them. It is thus an architectural form designed to render 
individuals constantly subject to the knowledge and power of the central authorities.”). 
113 See e.g. Neil Richards, The Electronic Panopticon, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 16, 2015) 
http://chronicle.com/article/The-Electronic-Panopticon/228419; Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 
101 MINN.  L. REV.  87, 152-53 (2016) (describing online ratings and review systems as “creat[ing] a 
true Foucauldian panopticonote ”); Bryan Druzin & Jessica Li, Censorship's Fragile Grip on the 
Internet: Can Online Speech Be Controlled?, 49 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 369, 377-81  2016 (Characterizing 
Chinese internet regulations as creating a “cyber-Panopticonote ”). This list is certainly not exhaustive. 
The idea of a central entity surveilling a much larger population has proved to be a remarkably useful 
metaphor for describing everything from CCTV to DNA databases. 
114 Turkel, supra note 88, at 184 (“The prison, the characteristic form of punishment that emerges 
through the nineteenth century, works both as an 'apparatus of knowledge' that develops a 'whole corpus 
of individualizing knowledge' around the criminal potential within the individual, and as an institution 
that attempts to change the behaviour, the habits, and the very attitude of the inmate through therapeutic 
regimes. In this endeavour, the prison shares with other institutions - the school, the hospital, the asylum, 
the factory, the military - the formation of techniques and knowledge that discipline the individual for 
socially useful ends.”). 
115 Foucault, supra note 6, at 201 (“[T]he major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate 
a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”). 
116 See e.g., David Garland, Criminological Knowledge and Its Relation to Power, 32 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 403, 405 (1992) (“Criminology is thus viewed as a 'technology of the soul', a normalizing 
discourse which emerged out of the prison and which now feeds back into the disciplinary process of 
modern penality, endlessly repeating itself in order to sustain the power mechanisms which it supports.”). 
117 Turkel, supra note 88, at 186 (“Normalization, 'one of the great instruments of power', makes 
people both formally equal, since they are judged by the same standards, and individuated, since they 
are seen as different in terms of this standard.”). 
118 Turkel, supra note 88, at 187 (“From the standpoint of capitalist political economy and class 
conflict, the prison has been perpetuated because it 'has succeeded extremely well in producing 
delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous - and, on occasion, usable - 
form of illegality.’”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
140        WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW         [VOL. 10:123 
 
 
 
any objective critique of the distribution of the norm are at best secondary. 
The process is a success when it works because it works. It is, again, order 
for the sake of order.  
 IV. THE PANOPTICON AND THE GUIDELINES: PUTTING PEOPLE INTO 
BOXES 
Foucault saw the prison, and its institutional framework, as integral to 
a modern political economy.119 The prison, and its attendant mechanisms,120 
was designed to appropriately sequester crime—to minimize its effects, by 
building literal and philosophical walls between the citizen and the 
criminal.121 The Sentencing Guidelines operate similar mechanisms. By 
objectifying and classifying offender and offense characteristics and by 
constraining the exercise of human judgment to a mathematical equation, 
the Guidelines disrupt the base sentencing relationship,122 ossify social 
stratification, and encourage recidivism. While some of these effects are 
exacerbated by the past and present iterations of the Guidelines, the 
fundamental flaws are rooted in the base concept. 
 A. Sentencing Matters: Sentencing Arguments Allow the 
Defendant To Be Heard 
 The application of a top-down structured system of decision-
making will inevitably fail to meet the individualized needs of all practical 
 
 
119 Foucault, supra note 6, at 272 (“Penality would then appear to be a way of handling illegalities, 
of laying down the limits of tolerance, of giving free rein to some, making another useful, of neutralizing 
certain individuals and of profiting from others. In short, penality does not simply ‘check’ illegalities; it 
‘differentiates’ them, it provides them with a general economy.”); see also Garland supra note 18, at 856 
(“More generally the development of a capitalist economy brought about new and stricter attitudes 
towards the nonobservance of law on the part of the rising classes….This framework was thus designed 
to deter the incipient criminality of the lower classes in a new and efficient manner but also to limit the 
arbitrary power of the sovereign at the same time.”). 
120 Foucault, supra note 6, at 267-68. In his estimation, prisons encourage recidivism, by gathering 
criminals together in one place “mak[ing] possible, even encourag[ing], the organization of a milieu of 
delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchizd, ready to aid and abet any future criminal act[;]” through 
collateral consequences preventing a return to a law-abiding existence; and through the subsequent 
impoverishment of the convict’s family. Id. See also Sharon Dolovich, Confronting The Costs Of 
Incarceration: Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 245 (2009) 
(“The people who have been marked out for incarceration may become through the experience of 
incarceration the very ‘anti-social’ misfits whose exclusion from society was thought so necessary.”). 
121 Foucault, supra note 6, at 301 (“In short, the carceral archipelago assures, in the depths of the 
social body, the formation of delinquency on the basis of subtle illegalities, the overlapping of the latter 
by the former and the establishment of a specific criminality.”). 
122 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1252. 
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applications in any sufficiently complex body.123 These imperfections 
underlie the axiomatic truisms forming the basis of our criminal justice 
system.124 In many areas of the law, such acceptable losses may make 
sense.125 Where particularity is a fundamental value, however, acceptable 
losses become more problematic. For a process with immense 
consequences for people’s lives, such failures are troubling and lead to the 
question of how much failure is acceptable.126 This interaction, between two 
individuals, forms the core discourse. Whether pleading for mercy, arguing 
for leniency, or simply stating defiance, it is the accused’s moment to tell 
their story. In a criminal justice system increasingly dependent on plea 
bargaining,127 it may be the only time the defendant is heard. Even in the 
increasingly rare circumstances where a case goes to trial, the real story, 
such as it is, does not necessarily bear a direct relationship to the trial 
narrative.128 
Structurally, trials and investigations are limited factual inquiries into 
specific circumstances, structured around a series of legal elements.129 The 
defendant is still presumed innocent and in possession of rights and 
protection from the potential excesses of the state. Both have narrative 
progression, dramatic tension, and clearly delineated conflict.130 The 
 
 
123 See Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 447, 488-91 (2016) (discussing the different effects of rules and standards in sentencing). 
124 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1077 (1970) (“In this context, I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free.”). 
125 Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 
435 (1995). 
126 Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 2 (Examining the Guidelines continuation and exacerbation 
of unwarranted disparity). 
127 William Pizzi, American Exceptionalism: The Effects of the“Vanishing Trial”on Our 
Incarceration Rate, 28 FED. SENT. R. 330 (2016) (“In 1974, 80 percent of our convictions came from 
plea bargaining; now the percentage is much higher – close to 96 or 97 percent.”). 
128 Lisa Kern Griffin, Article: Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013) (“Narrative 
provides a deep structure inside the courtroom just as it does outside of it, not only so that triers of fact 
can ‘organize and reorganize large amounts of constantly changing information,’ but also so that they 
can decide what it means. In order to reach a verdict, jurors construct a story, learn of their decision 
alternatives and the ‘verdict category attributes,’ and then classify the story ‘into the best fitting verdict 
category.’). 
129 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Article: Two Conceptions Of Emotion In Criminal 
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 368 (1996) (“In determining an offender's guilt or innocence, and the 
grade of her offense, the law evaluates her actions, including her emotional motivations; and at that 
point, the law - at least if it takes an evaluative stance on emotions - is ordinarily unconcerned with how 
the defendant came to be the way she is.”). 
130 Jennifer Lee, Article: Binary Determinations Of Guilt Or Innocence: Reading Between The 
Lines Of People V. Du, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 184 (2003) (“In criminal law, the 
determination of guilt or innocence is a primary example of the binary predicate: the defendant must be 
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process consists of assembling bits of disparate information into a 
narrative.131 The entire process is structured for, and around, story-telling, 
reconstructing prior events in a convincing and compelling way.132 The 
pathos is built in; something bad has almost always happened to someone. 
The ethos, too, is inherent; there’s a good guy and a bad guy. Lastly, there 
is a natural conclusion. Either a person will be punished or they will not. 
While there are inevitable complexities within the structure, the structure 
itself remains both basic and fundamental.133 Each side is looking to either 
establish or discredit a predetermined set of legally significant facts. A trial, 
therefore, generally doesn’t seek to establish anything beyond a binary 
calculation of whether or not a series of events occurred. 
Trials are generally unconcerned with the person; the nature of the 
person is, in theory, less important than their actions. If the defendant says, 
“I did this because...”, generally only the first three words matter. The trial 
aspect, wherein guilt is decided, is a controlled, limited exchange of 
information.134 The nullification aspects of early American jurisprudence 
are negated by the limited function of the jury; the modern criminal jury 
does not decide what’s “fair” or what the defendant “deserves.”135 The guilt 
phase of criminal trial has rules and structure.  While there is a great deal 
of latitude in what narratives can be told, the jury ultimately is left to decide 
whether or not a series of things happened. It is up to the court, in 
adjudicating the sentence, to decide what the fact of those happenings 
means.136 
 
 
either guilty or innocent. Ultimately, the criminal law system entirely revolves around the resolution of 
this issue.”). 
131 See Awol K. Allo, Article: The 'Show' In The 'Show Trial': Contextualizing The Politicization 
Of The Courtroom, 15 BARRY L. REV. 41, 48 (2010) (“The adversarial trial is particularly suited for this 
reductive categorization of complex issues that the trial seeks to grasp only in legal-jurisprudential terms, 
and the spectacle it allows intensifies the consolidation of the pseudo images created by lawyers intent 
on theatricalizing the proceeding because the 'means' are strategically decided to achieve the end.”). 
132 Lee, supra note 130, at 189 (“In shutting out the chaotic elements of the human experience, 
the binary method enables the construction of meta-narratives in criminal law, such that every story 
becomes reduced to a neutral, non-contingent set of logical relations.”). This creates potential conflict 
with the truth-seeking function of trials. 
133 Id. at 190. (“In effect, the deterministic nature of criminal law organizes people into categories 
and rationalizes the result to make it appear both natural and logical.”). 
134 See e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 404 (limiting the use of character evidence to demonstrate propensity); 
Fed. R. Evid. 801-02 (limiting the use of out of court statements). 
135 Douglas G. Smith, Structural And Functional Aspects Of The Jury: Comparative Analysis And 
Proposals For Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 450 (1997) (“The role of the jury in the modern trial is 
generally that of a passive observer rather than an active inquirer…. Historically, the jury exercised [a 
sentencing] function indirectly, if not directly, and artificially separating a determination of outcome 
from the determination of sanction unduly restricts the scope of the jury's power.”). 
136 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1254 (“[I]t is in the nature of moral and juridical principles 
that they must be informed by a particular set of facts before they can be applied.” Ronald M. Dworkin, 
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As such, sentencing can be, and often is, the only time the accused 
person has the opportunity to fully explain themselves and their actions.137 
While the full dialogue includes input from a variety of parties, it is the 
accused’s story to tell and the judge’s decision to make. Structurally, the 
major source of tension is gone; the person is guilty. With the guilty verdict 
comes a stripped down set of rights.138 The procedural complexity of the 
trial is gone. The defendant may no longer demand certain things; he or she 
can only request. Sentencing, even under the Guidelines, is a less structured 
process: evidence is nearly unlimited;139 the standard of proof is lowered,140 
and the relevant questions become broader and more philosophical.141 This 
discourse necessarily involves a juxtaposition of several social 
understandings, and is one of the only areas of criminal law where the 
offender, the subject of the criminal justice system, begins to take on some 
individual characteristics.142 The offender, seen during the preceding phases 
as the subject of evidence, rights, and procedures, is treated as unique.143 
 
 
Is Law A System of Rules?, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 44-48 (Ronald M. Dworkin ed., 1977) 
(distinguishing between principles and rules in law). 
137 It is worth noting that an estimated 6 million people cannot vote because of a felony conviction. 
Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson, & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of 
Felony Disenfranchisement (2016) http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-
voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016. 
138 See SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION, Ch. 17, §A1 (characterizing death 
penalty, incarceration, and fines as loss of right to life, right to liberty, right to property respectively), 
GEORGE BROOKS, FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LAW, HISTORY, POLICY, AND POLITICS, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851 (2005); see also, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001); 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (discussing the limits of Fourth amendment 
right of probationers and parolees). 
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); see also Erik 
Lillquist, The Puzzling Return Of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N. C.L. REV. 621, 
682 (“The nature of many modern American sentencing schemes means that a large amount of evidence 
that is normally inadmissible at trial could be admissible for sentencing purposes. For instance, prior 
convictions are often the most important information in determining a sentence. Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, such evidence can double or even sometimes triple the sentence”). 
140 Lillquist, supra note 139, at 685 (“In most modern sentencing schemes, the standard of proof 
is lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; usually, it is a preponderance of the evidence, although 
sometimes it might be clear and convincing evidence.”). 
141 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1252 (“We take as an established truth of our constitutional 
order that the criminal justice system exists not only to protect society in a reasonably efficient and 
humane way, but also to defend, affirm, and, when necessary, clarify the moral principles embodied in 
our laws. In the traditional ritual of sentencing, the judge pronounced not only a sentence, but society's 
condemnation as well.”). 
142 Id. (“The judge's power to weigh all of the circumstances of the particular case and all of the 
purposes of criminal punishment represented an important acknowledgment of the moral personhood of 
the defendant and of the moral dimension of crime and punishment.”). 
143 See e.g. United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Even under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, particularized sentencing is mandated.”); John Garry, Why Me?: Application And 
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The central structure is no longer a binary conflict between guilt and 
innocence but a conversation in which the potential outcomes are, 
theoretically, nearly unlimited.144 While the underlying process still 
revolves around stories, those stories are not held up to a set of defined 
elements but, rather, judged against broad and potentially ambiguous social 
principles.145 The relatively simple dichotomy of good and bad have been 
replaced with a spectrum—a qualitative evaluation of weight and degree.146 
The operative judgment is not a binary true or false, but an evaluative 
comparison of an individual’s moral culpability with a range of somewhat 
ambiguous interests.147 Sentencing guidelines attempt to overlay a sense of 
order on top of this dialogic process by narrowing the range of discretion, 
quantifying behavioral characteristics, and creating a centralized 
bureaucracy overseeing the process.148 While the desire to impose some 
order on such a system has nobility of purpose, the rigid application of top-
 
 
Misapplication Of 3a1.1, The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement Of The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 180 (“While such presumptions [relating to Guideline sentencing 
enhancement] may offer the illusion of furthering the overall congressional goal of uniformity in 
sentencing, Congress never intended to purchase uniformity at the price of sacrificing particularized 
inquiry into criminal conduct.”). 
144 In practice, there are constraints. Sentencing guidelines, the subject of this writing, and plea 
negotiations both serve as examples that impose limitations on the sentencing outcome. They are, 
however, generally discretionary. With the exception of Eighth Amendment and some procedural 
constraints, few sentencing limitations are strictly mandatory. This note is discussing the Guidelines 
through a primarily theoretical, the practical limitations are secondary. See United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 § (c)(3). 
145 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1252 (“The judge's power to weigh all of the circumstances 
of the particular case and all of the purposes of criminal punishment represented an important 
acknowledgment of the moral personhood of the defendant and of the moral dimension of crime and 
punishment.”). 
146 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 129, at 368 (“[D]uring the sentencing process, the law has 
traditionally permitted the story of the defendant's character-formation to come before the judge or jury 
in all its narrative complexity, in such a way as to manifest any factors hidden in the background of this 
life that might, once presented, give rise to sympathetic assessment and to a merciful mitigation of 
punishment.”). 
147 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a)(2); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing 
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 
281-84 (1993) ([The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984], failed to adopt any particular philosophy of 
penology. Instead, it simply identified the four generally recognized justifications for criminal 
sentencing--retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation--as factors for the sentencing court 
"to consider," without acknowledging the differences and tensions among these rationales. Yet at least 
since the Enlightenment, philosophers, penologists, and public officials have debated the propriety and 
efficacy of each of these purposes or objectives of criminal sentencing”), Marc Miller, Purposes At 
Sentencing., 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 419 (1992) (“The failure of the Commission and the courts to 
incorporate and advance these purposes underlies many of the system's critics' strongest complaints.”). 
148 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §1A1.3 (Nov. 2016) (stating the 
enacting legislation’s purpose of “enhancing the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime 
through an effective, fair sentencing system” by focusing on three basic objectives: honesty, uniformity, 
and proportionality). 
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down rules is both problematic within American jurisprudence149 and 
contradictory to the concept of individualized sentencing. Adopting a 
structured, rule-based approach similar to the guilt phase—the result of an 
immense amount of litigation—creates a troubling dynamic in the 
sentencing phase. The Guidelines, by imposing structured discretion 
according to a predetermined formula, subvert the fundamental dialogue 
and create a recursive discourse that stands in the way of developing a 
coherent sentencing law and normalizes the inequities in the criminal 
justice system. 
B. Managing Disparate Discourses 
In attempting to corral this discourse and create a sense of order, the 
Guidelines created an alternative discourse, occurring between the 
oversight body, the Commission, and the overseen, the judge.150 This 
additional discourse has an enormous effect on the process. The most 
prominent effect was to shift the relevant discretionary authority to the 
prosecutor by making the eventual sentence more dependent on the 
charging decision.151 Additionally, though, the creation of a complex 
decisional architecture created a mechanism for direct political 
involvement in the meting out of criminal punishment.152 Overall, the state, 
as a whole, still retains its power while the defendant, the individual who 
serves as the object of both discourses, is diminished and externalized.153 
 
 
149 See Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 112 S. Ct. 869 (1982) ("By requiring that the sentencer be 
permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime' the rule in Lockett 
recognizes that "justice … requires … that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender.'" (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 
51, 61 (1937))). 
150 Id. (“[I]t would be wrong to assume that one can change the behavior of one player in the 
system without that change having an impact on all of the others. Discretion is hydraulic; you take it 
away from one and it flows to another.”). 
151 Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory 
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 87 
(2003) (“The results of [mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines] are significantly longer federal 
prison sentences, as was the intent of these reforms, and the emergence of federal prosecutors as the key 
players in sentencing.”). 
152 Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal For Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing 
After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 171 (“Once the Sentencing Commission gave birth to a 258-
box sentencing table with detailed instructions for placing defendants in those boxes, the options 
available to Members of Congress seeking a legislative response to a specific type of crime 
mushroomed.”). 
153 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 115 (“Increasing prosecutorial power and the severity of criminal 
punishments was not the unintended consequence of Guidelines designed to reduce sentencing disparity. 
Instead, it was the point all along.”). 
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The SRA removed a portion of the sentencing judge’s nearly unlimited 
discretion and placed it in the hands of an oversight body in the name of 
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality.154 Because there is no guiding 
principle or theory, ambiguities and areas lacking in clarity, as are inevitable 
in any complex system, cannot be subject to reasonably unifying 
interpretation.155 This incentivizes staying within the overarching 
structure.156 By “institutionalizing discretion” without addressing the 
underlying concerns that lead to the sentencing reforms, the Guidelines split 
the dialogue: the discourse between the sentenced and sentence is 
constrained to the empirical dictates of the Guideline formula.157 In shifting 
the discretion, the Guidelines have merely shifted the disparities.158 
Differently situated defendants,159 accused of the same or similar crimes, 
are less able to argue the importance of those differences.160 Consequently, 
 
 
154 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual §1A3, postscript (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 
155 Or, at least, is at odds with the common-law nature of the American judicial system. Nancy 
Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 576-577 (2010) (“The 
SRA and the complex Guidelines that had been promulgated created an ideology of interpretation not 
unlike one in a civil code country: The Guidelines were comprehensive; they were the work of ‘experts, 
and if there were gaps, the experts had to fill them; and judges were to be expert clerks, not interpreting 
the document, but rendering sentencing ‘answers.’ The result was a jurisprudence wholly alien to a 
common law court.”). 
156 In 2015, 47.3% of sentences, for which data were available, were within the Guidelines with 
a further 29.3% of departures coming at the request of the government. UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, NATIONAL COMPARISON OF SENTENCE IMPOSED AND POSITION RELATIVE TO THE 
GUIDELINE RANGE, Table N (2015) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/TableN.pdf; see also Gertner, supra note 62, at 540 
(“In effect, the Guidelines enabled judges to cede moral decision making to another body; their task 
became the application of an apparently rational formula to the case at hand – a purely cognitive 
process.”). 
157 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1263 (“The sentencing proceeding itself has been recast 
from a discretionary into a formal adjudicatory process, in which the court makes findings of fact that 
translate into sentencing requirements under the Guidelines…The judge who conducts the sentencing is 
now, by design, little more than the instrument of a distant bureaucracy.”). 
158 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 89 (“Adopting the viewpoint of a person of ordinary moral 
sensibilities rather than of the Sentencing Commission leads quickly to the conclusion that the 
Sentencing Guidelines have substituted new disparities for old ones.”). 
159 See e.g., Rakoff, supra note 1, at 3 (Comparing two defendants charged with defrauding 
different amounts from different victims, $1 million from “high-rolling” investors or $100,000 from 
subsequently impoverished widows, and relative moral culpability of each); Alschuler, supra note 2, at 
89-95 (discussing the normative disparities of the Guidelines). 
160 For examples of current and former judges discussing sentencing under the Guidelines: Stith 
& Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1266 (“The judicial fact-finding required by the Guidelines is both tedious 
and difficult. Little may hinge on the issue in dispute because the existence of a particular aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance may ultimately have little effect on the length of a sentence. Yet many minor 
factual distinctions are often exceedingly difficult to resolve because they are complicated or 
ambiguous.”); Gertner, supra note 62, at 533 (“Everything that I thought was important - that 
neuroscientists, for example, have found to be salient in affecting behavior - was irrelevant to the analysis 
I was supposed to conduct.”); Rakoff, 26 Fed. Sent. R. 6 at 3 “Such bizarre results under the Guidelines 
are, in my experience, more the norm than the exception: a function of singling out one factor for 
emphasis, and then ascribing it overwhelming weight.”). 
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the sentencing decision becomes less a matter of the defendant’s moral 
culpability than whether or not their factual scenario fits into certain 
predetermined ratios. 
The Guidelines, while most directly aimed at judges, have the most 
troubling impact on defendants, most of whom come from already 
marginalized groups.161 By denying these groups the opportunity to share 
and be judged on the particulars of their unique experience, the Guidelines 
also deny them agency within the system.162 Since commonly-incarcerated 
populations often face barriers to political engagement and generally lack 
the resources to pursue civil complaints,163 sentencing may be one of the 
few areas where defendants engage in a meaningful discourse with a 
government actor. In discourse designed to produce a sentence based on an 
individual’s moral culpability, the defendant’s unique knowledge, that of 
their own personal history and motivations, has value.164 Under the 
Guidelines, that value is excised.165 By defining the meaningful terms of 
the discourse, the Guidelines move the locus of the conversation towards 
the institution, diminishing and marginalizing the defendant’s 
 
 
161  See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration 
Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015) 
 https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html (July 9, 2015) (“[I]n 2014 dollars, 
incarcerated people had a median annual income of $19,185 prior to their incarceration, which is 41% 
less than non-incarcerated people of similar ages.”); Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration 
in the 2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, 
 https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html (May 28, 2014) (“Nationally, according to the 
U.S. Census, Blacks are incarcerated five times more than Whites are, and Hispanics are nearly twice as 
likely to be incarcerated as Whites.”). 
162 Turkel, supra note 86, at 176 (“[T]here are 'procedures of exclusion' which limit and control 
discourse through its internal relations. Included here are procedures that place certain topics and objects 
of knowledge outside of major locations of discussion and analysis. This marginalizes these topics and 
objects of knowledge to the peripheries of discourses.”). 
163 See Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to 
Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 441-42 (2014) (Describing institutional barriers, fewer 
skills and resources conducive to political engagement, discouragement, and residential segregation as 
contributing to declining rates of political participation among the poor). 
164 Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power 
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 26-27 (discussing information power in 
the context of negotiation relationships). 
165 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 42, at 1263 (“The defendant may implore the court to consider 
the full circumstances of his crime and his humanity, but the judge generally is not permitted to consider 
most of these circumstances in sentencing.”). 
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participation.166 The process is no longer an adjudication of an individual 
but, instead, a reiteration of social norms.167 
C. Normalization By Incorporation 
The offender has become, to a great extent, the object of an 
overarching and expanding body of knowledge, both institutionally and 
academically.168 This knowledge body, both implicitly and explicitly, 
classifies and normalizes the offender and the offensive conduct.169 The 
criminal justice apparatus is seen as a central institution. The offensive 
behavior is studied, understood, and accepted. By putting the behavior 
within an institutionally-determined box, the institution accepts the 
behavior, endorses it, and perpetuates it.170 The assignment of a given  
value, in the form of a calculated punishment aimed at deterrence, 
implicitly accepts the behavior as a part of the economic calculus.171 The 
criminal justice system has, indeed, become integral to the functioning of 
society, or at least aspects of society. The federal criminal code in the United 
 
 
166 Turkel, supra note 86, at 177 (“Discourses are controlled by the conditions that restrict access 
to communication and shape the process of communication, limiting discourse to speakers who are 
deemed 'qualified' in terms of formal education and professional certification, patterns of language and 
gestures that delimit discourse, communications through specialized languages and journals, and the 
particular groups to which discourse is restricted.”). 
167 Garland, supra note 18 at 859 (“[Normalization] involves, first of all, a means of assessing the 
individual in relation to a desired standard of conduct: a means of knowing how the individual performs, 
watching his movements, assessing his behavior, and measuring it against the rule.”). 
168 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2015 ANN. REP., A-5 (2015) (“In order to conduct the 
type of research outlined in the previous section and produce accurate and timely reports, the 
Commission collects data regarding every felony and class A misdemeanor offense sentenced each 
year.”) see also Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the Inventor of Scientific Criminology Who 
Died at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Continues to Haunt American Crime Control at the 
Beginning of the Twenty-first, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2135, 2167 (2006) (“During the ‘War on Crime,’ the 
federal government has pumped research funding into this science project and, as a result, criminology 
as a discipline has grown rapidly.”). 
169 Id. at 2136 (“Positivist criminology, broadly conceived, is the project of subjecting criminal 
behavior to scientific study and bringing the findings of this science to bear in the practice of criminal 
justice.”). 
170 Roger-Pol Droit, Michel Foucault, On the Role of Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 1975), 
(“Criminal psychiatry and psychology risk becoming the ultimate alibi behind which the prevailing 
system will hide in order to remain unchanged.”) 
 https://www.nytimes.com/books/00/12/17/specials/foucault-prisons.html. See also Foucault, 
note 6 at 296 (“The supervision of normality was firmly encased in a medicine or a psychiatry that 
provided it with a sort of ‘scientificity’; it was supported by a judicial apparatus which, directly or 
indirectly, gave it legal jusitification.”). 
171 Foucault, supra note 6 at 300 (“The carceral network does not cast the unassimilable into a 
confused hell; there is no outside….In this panoptic society of which incarceration is the omnipresent 
armature, the delinquent is not outside the law; he is, from the very outset, in the law, at the very heart 
of the law, or at least in the midst of those mechanisms that transfer the individual imperceptibly from 
discipline to the law, from deviation to offense.”). 
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States has greatly expanded.172 Many of these new crimes are regulatory in 
nature, putting people into the criminal justice system for behavior or 
actions that would not have historically warranted sanction.173 The failure 
or inadequacy of the predicate social institutions has put considerably more 
pressure on criminal institutions.174 Police and the courts are the primary 
point, and sometimes only, point of contact for mental illness175 and drug 
addiction.176 Inadequate investment in other social institutions becomes the 
court system’s problem to solve. By incorporating these factors, either 
implicitly or explicitly, as fundamental to the act of judgment, the 
Guidelines accept these problems as within the purview of the criminal 
justice system. But the criminal justice system is wildly inadequate at 
dealing with the result of the rest of the social system’s failures. Criminal 
justice is inextricably linked with poverty, mental illness,177 and drug 
addiction.178 These are issues for which the system is wildly 
inappropriate.179 The primary action of the criminal justice system is 
 
 
172 Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 538 
(“Federal criminal law has been growing at a breakneck pace for generations. According to a 1998 
American Bar Association report, an incredible 40% of the thousands of federal criminal laws passed 
since the Civil War were enacted after 1970.”). 
173 Id. 
174 Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, American Bar Association: Joint Task Force on Reversing 
the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016) (“The school-to-prison pipeline - the 
metaphor encompassing the various issues in our education system that result in students leaving school 
and becoming involved in the criminal justice system - is one of our nation's most formidable 
challenges.”). 
175 Gary Howell, The Dark Frontier: The Violent And Often Tragic Point Of Contact Between 
Law Enforcement And The Mentally Ill, 17 SCHOLAR 343 (2015) (discussing the circumstances and 
problems surrounding the growing amount of police engagement with the mentally ill.). 
176 Gregory A. Knott, Cost and Punishment: Reassessing Incarceration Costs and the Value of 
College-in-Prison Programs, 32 N.  ILL. U. L. REV. 267, 277 (2012) (“In general, as many as 35.6% of 
convicted jail inmates were under the influence of some substance when they committed the crime that 
landed them in jail. Over 2/3 of jail inmates fell under the definition of substance abuse or substance 
dependence in the year before their arrest.”). 
177 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 6 (2014) 
 http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars/treatment-
behind-bars.pdf (“In 2012, there were estimated to be 356,268 inmates with severe mental illness in 
prisons and jails. […] [T]he number of mentally ill persons in prisons and jails was 10 times the number 
remaining in state hospitals.”). 
178 CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SPECIAL REPORT: DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS 2004, 6 (2006) 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf (revised Jan. 19, 2007) (finding that 53% of state 
prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners met the criteria for drug dependence). 
179 E. Lea Johnston, Conditions Of Confinement At Sentencing: The Case Of Seriously Disordered 
Offenders, 63 CATH. U.L. REV. 625, 638 (2014) (“Prisons generally apply the principle of least 
eligibility, deliberately maintaining the level of health care a step below the services that the government 
provides to the non-incarcerated population that relies on public assistance. Under this principle, ‘the 
level of prison conditions should always compare unfavorably to the material living standards of the 
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punitive, generally either through use of fines or imprisonment.180 These 
tools are, at best, heavy-handed. At worst, they serve to further victimize 
and traumatize already vulnerable populations by not only ignoring 
legitimate impetuses for their malfeasance but assigning a level of moral 
culpability to circumstances that may not be fully within the defendant’s 
control.181 By implicitly incorporating these as factors into sentencing, the 
Guidelines adopt the proposition that the criminal justice system is capable 
of defining and understanding these factors, while explicitly declining to 
address them in a constructive way.182 
D. The Development of Guidelines Experts: A Missed Opportunity 
Sentencing under the rehabilitative regime was predicated, in part, on 
the premise that judges were experts who are able to assess an individual’s 
moral culpability and assign the appropriate amount of punishment.183 With 
a functional lack of appellate review, the judge’s power to sentence was 
subject to few external constraints.184 Even within the individual sentencing 
process, the judge had few limitations as to the information underlying the 
 
 
laboring poor,’ because prisoners ‘are the least eligible or least deserving members of society for any 
free benefit from the government.’”). 
180 See Shima Baradaran, Drugs And Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 231 (2015) (“The edifice 
of drug policy relies on the premise that drugs cause violence, with incarceration as the primary tool.”). 
181 Mirko Bagaric, A Rational (Unapologetically Pragmatic) Approach to Dealing with the 
Irrational - The Sentencing of Offenders with Mental Disorders, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 35 (2016) 
(“While mental disorders vary greatly in terms of nature and intensity, by definition, all mental disorders 
to some degree inhibit an individual's use of optimum levels of cognitive, emotional, and normative 
understanding and reasoning.”) (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders xxi (4th ed. 1994)). 
182 This is illustrated in Part H of the Guideline Manual which lists addiction, lack of education, 
or psychological issues as “not ordinarily relevant.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§5H1.2-
6. Race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, and disadvantage or lack of guidance 
or disadvantage as a youth are not relevant. §§5H1.10, 12. By either discouraging or preventing courts 
from considering some of the obstacles facing marginalized populations, the Guidelines, in essence, 
criminalize the failure to overcome these obstacles. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 107 S. 
Ct. 837, 841 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“In my view, evidence about the defendant's background 
and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit 
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, 
may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse."). 
183 Gertner, supra note 19, at 571 (“The judge's role was essentially therapeutic, much like a 
physician. The judge was seen as an ‘expert’ in individualizing the sentence to reflect the goals of 
punishment, including rehabilitation and deterrence.”). 
184 Id. at 696 (“Judges and parole authorities had the most power relative to the other sentencing 
players. They were the acknowledged sentencing experts. There were few a priori rules or standards. 
Each case was resolved on its own merits; to the extent there were standards, they evolved from the day-
to-day experience of sentencing individuals.”). 
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decision.185 However, the experts were significantly lacking in expertise.186 
Sentencing was not, and is still not, a particularly widely taught topic.187 
Judges, as a whole, tend to be from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, 
which are often not shared by the people they are sentencing, a 
circumstance leading to potential bias concerns.188 These are all issues that 
can be alleviated through better training and education.189 To the extent that 
sentencing reform was an effort to address these issues, it failed.190 There 
was, and possibly still is, an opportunity to incorporate a much broader 
knowledge base into sentencing policy.191 Although the creation of the 
Guidelines has necessitated, both statutorily192 and practically,193 extensive 
training, this training is primarily, if not solely, focused on the use of the 
Guidelines themselves.194 The knowledge accrued is not about the potential 
externalities195 surrounding the crime and the criminal but about the 
 
 
185 Id. at 695 (“The rationale was straightforward: it made no more sense to limit the kind of 
information that a judge should get at sentencing to exercise his or her “clinical” role than to limit the 
information available to a medical doctor in determining a diagnosis.”). 
186 Gertner, supra note 36 at 528. 
187 Gertner, supra note 19, at 696- 97 (“Whatever the criminological literature, judges did not 
know about it. Sentencing was not taught in law schools; and to the extent there was any debate about 
deterrence and rehabilitation […]it was not reflected in judicial training.”)   
188 Compare AM. BAR ASS’N supra note 34 (reporting that the judiciary is largely comprised of 
white men) with Rabuy & Kopf supra note 158 (reporting that the median defendant makes under 
$20,000 a year), Sakala supra note 158 (reporting on the overrepresentation of blacks and Hispanics in 
the criminal justice system); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (finding that judges have implicit biases that affect 
their judgments).   
189 See e.g., Bernice B. Donald & Erica Bakies, A Glimpse Inside the Brain's Black Box: 
Understanding the Role of Neuroscience in Criminal Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 481, 482 
(“Without disregarding the criminal justice system's ability to hold those accountable for their actions, 
neuroscience can be utilized to demonstrate that certain actions may actually be the result of 
developmental problems associated with the brain, like the effects of complex trauma on children A 
judge may also use neuroscience to combat her implicit biases, which have ways of manifesting 
themselves in the courtroom and therefore need to be explicitly acknowledged.”). 
190 Given the political compromises that led to the Guidelines and the varied punitive philosophies 
of the various decision-makers responsible, any intent beyond a desire for consistency is merely 
speculation.  However, it is reasonable to assume that neither end of the ideological spectrum fully 
trusted the judiciary. 
191 See Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 1, 44 (2004). 
192 28 U.S.C.A. § 995(18) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-45). 
193 Gertner, supra note 62, at 538. 
194 Id. at 538 (“Significantly, this was training in the application of the Guidelines' formulas and 
how to compute the numbers, but there was still no training on the purposes of sentencing, alternatives 
to incarceration, what works to prevent recidivism or to effect deterrence.”). 
195 See e.g. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For The Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing And 
Everything, 359 Phil. Transactions Royal Soc'y London B 1775 (2004) (asserting that, while unlikely to 
undermine the basic assumptions of criminal responsibility, “advances in neuroscience are likely to 
change the way people think about human action and criminal responsibility by vividly illustrating 
lessons that some people appreciated long ago.”). 
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procedural complexities governing the judicial response. Sentencing 
expertise becomes about expertise in the Sentencing Guidelines. In doing, 
the Commission creates its own internalized, recursive discourse. 
V. ORDER WITHOUT PURPOSE 
 The desire for sentencing reform was, and still is, a laudable one. 
While the body of criminal law is primarily comprised of trial and pre-trial 
legal issues, sentencing has a far greater impact on defendants.196 Designing 
any broad system that achieves its social purpose is an immensely difficult 
task and one that requires, as a necessary predicate, a sense of purpose.197 
The Sentencing Guidelines, fundamentally, lack a sense of purpose.198 The 
purported reasons for the Guidelines, certainty and fairness, are 
contradictory and create an inherent tension in their application.199 In a 
society where a tremendous amount of behavior could be subject to 
criminal sanction and the criminal code is an increasingly regulatory 
device,200 the operative question is not what constitutes criminal behavior 
but how we respond to it. When a person is asking why we, as a society, are 
deciding to deprive them of their life, liberty, or property, it would behoove 
us, and them, to have a reason. A system which serves as its own 
justification provides little or no incentives for growth or change, either for 
the system itself or for the people whom it affects.201  
 
 
196 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1152 (2001) (“The ninety-one percent of defendants who plead guilty will 
never be heard at trial. Their only hearings are at sentencing, where they can dispute various 
enhancements and other sentencing facts.”); see also Covey, supra note 123, at 452 (“Ensuring that our 
sentencing structures create opportunities for each important constituency to have a voice in the process 
is, ultimately, the true mark of a well-designed legal system.”). 
197 Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2006) 
(“Building sentencing systems that are rational, just, and effective starts with understanding what 
sentencing is for and what it can do.”). 
198 Id. at 15 (“The pre-Booker federal sentencing guidelines are a case study in what can happen 
when policy makers fail to be clear about their purposes and functional goals.”). 
199 See Covey, supra note 123, at 488-89 (“Regardless of how the rules-standards problem is 
negotiated, outcomes will always violate the uniformity-proportionality test from one perspective or the 
other. The root problem is the infinite number of factors that might be deemed relevant under varying 
circumstances, accompanied by the difficulty of determining a priority among them.”). 
200 Smith supra note 172, at 538 (“Contemporary criminal codes reach conduct that, in previous 
generations, would not have been subject to punishment.”). 
201 On the individual level, this may be demonstrated by the increasingly severe penalties for 
continued recidivism, regardless of the nature of the offense, and the inability of decreasing those 
penalties despite a negative correlation between recidivism and age, something the Sentencing 
Commission has acknowledged but decline to act on.  Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The 
Influence of Criminal History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 128 (2015) (“Overall, 
a common theme of life course criminology is the finding that a majority of one-time offenders do not 
go on to lead lives of crime but indeed age out of, or otherwise desist from, criminal activity. For this 
reason, the United States Sentencing Commission has suggested that factoring criminal history along 
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This is the Guidelines biggest failure and it is one that is inherent to 
the concept of structured guidelines. By creating an alternative discourse 
which pulls the focus of the dialogue away from the core relationship, the 
Guidelines push the offender further away from society, not through 
banishment or “civil death,” but by contributing to the creation of an 
alternative existence, one in which the cycle of poverty and prison now 
have an institutional justification.202 The Guidelines subvert the primacy of 
the human interaction underlying the punitive decision. Improving judicial 
training,203 strengthening and adding resources for the sentencing 
process,204 and creating a corpus of sentencing law that can then be 
interpreted individually are all methods of reform that respect this 
relationship. It is the person being judged and the person doing the judging 
that matter most. One of the messages of Discipline And Punish was that 
putting people in boxes in response to crime only increases crime.205 Putting 
judges in boxes in the name of “certainty and fairness” has created a similar 
irony in judicial outcomes.206 A system without a rationale can seem 
arbitrary and capricious to those outside the system while seeming self-
evident to those who work within it. In criminal sentencing, where the 
power of the state directly and powerfully impacts the individual, such 
divisions only serve to further marginalize the already vulnerable.207 
Ultimately, a system which does not acknowledge or respond to the 
individual cannot create a place for the individual. 
  
 
 
 
with age would improve the predictive validity for recidivism.”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
202 See Brown, 479 U.S. at 545. 
203 See Gertner, supra note 62, at 545 (“Judicial training can go beyond Guidelines-speak. Judges 
can be trained in how to evaluate what works and what does not and what offenders would be amenable 
to which sentencing alternatives.”). 
204 Id. at 542 (“Guidelines sentencing, at least in some courts, is rote; post-Booker discretion 
should take more time, more resources, different training and analysis, different sources of information, 
a different kind of monitoring, and, as I describe below, different evidentiary rules.”). 
205 Garland, supra note 18, at 862 (“[Foucault] argues that the prison did not "discover" the 
delinquent, but rather it fabricated him[.]”). 
206 See Alschuler, supra note 2. 
207 See Redfield & Nance, supra note 174; Howell, supra note 175; Knott, supra note 176 at 277. 
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APPENDIX A208 
 
 
 
 
208 Sentencing Table taken from 2015 Sentencing Guidelines. 
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